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A
s policymakers, election officials, 
and the public consider whether 
New York should change the way 
in which voters are allowed to reg-
ister to participate in elections, and 
bring New York State election law into compliance with 
the Help America Vote Act, we provide an analysis of the 
potential impact of election day registration (EDR) in 
New York. The current system of registration is one in 
which citizens must register 25 days before election day 
in order to be eligible to vote.1 Under EDR this advance 
registration barrier would be eliminated as citizens could 
register on election day. 
It is important to note that our analysis of the effects of 
EDR on turnout is based on the experiences of other EDR 
states, which allow same day registration at the polling 
place. A legislative proposal currently under consider-
ation in New York (A.5762) would require voters to reg-
ister on election day at a location other than the polling 
place. Hence, the actual impact on turnout of EDR in New 
York is likely be less than the estimates we report here. 
This is because EDR in New York would entail two steps: 
registration at a local board of elections, and then casting 
a ballot at the appropriate local polling place. A second 
bill, A.5800, would rescind the current state constitutional 
requirement that voter registration take place at least 10 
days before elections.
Our findings may be broadly categorized in three 
ways. First, EDR should help increase voter registration 
and turnout in New York. In particular, our analysis finds 
that adjusting for the effects of age, mobility, and many 
other factors, New York could see its long-run turnout rate 
increase by as much as 8.6 percentage points in presiden-
tial elections. This means that turnout in the 2000 presi-
dential election in New York could have been as high as 
59 percent if EDR had been in place. 
Second, EDR is likely to make voting easier for citizens 
who have the most difficulty maintaining an up-to-date 
voter registration record in New York. Our analysis pre-
dicts as much as:
• A 12.3 percentage point increase in turnout by 18-to-
25-year-olds.
• A 9.8 percentage point increase in turnout by those 
with a grade school education or less.
• An 11 point increase in turnout by Latinos and an 
8.7 percentage point increase in turnout by African 
Americans.
• A 10.1 percentage point increase in turnout by those 
who have lived at their current address for less than six 
months.
• A 12.2 percentage point increase in turnout by natural-
ized citizens.
Third, New York could mitigate or avoid the prob-
lems commonly advanced by EDR opponents: added 
burdens on election administration, cost, and potential 
voter fraud. We address these concerns below. We show 
that states like Minnesota and Wisconsin that currently 
use EDR have developed effective laws and procedures 
that serve to minimize or eliminate these problems. We 
argue that should New York move to EDR, it too could 
mitigate or eliminate these problems through effective 
laws and procedures. And there is no reason to believe 
that implementation, as described in A.5762, would lead 
to increased voter fraud.
Executive Summary
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V oter registration is intended to ensure that vot-ers who are eligible to vote are able to do so, and that non-eligible individuals cannot cast 
ballots. A voter registration list enables election workers to 
authenticate eligible voters at the polls. Voter registration 
also serves to provide lists of persons (i.e., registered vot-
ers) who should receive notices informing them when elec-
tions are forthcoming, and where they should go to vote. 
However, there are costs associated with any system 
of voter registration. Principally, voter registration adds 
another step to the voting process and thus creates a bar-
rier to voting. In order to vote in New York people must 
know how to register, and must do so well in advance of 
any election. When people move, failure to update their 
registration can make them ineligible to vote. And people 
who show up at the polls may be disenfranchised if there 
are errors in the registration system. 
Problems with voter registration have led to two major 
reforms in the last fifteen years. The National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA,” commonly referred to 
as “motor voter”) requires states to provide voter registra-
tion material at sites where citizens register motor vehi-
cles. It also requires states to provide agency-based regis-
tration, where state offices that provide public assistance, 
services to persons with disabilities, and other aid must 
offer registration opportunities to each “applicant for 
services.” And, it requires states to offer and accept mail-
in forms for voter registration. The Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires states to create a statewide, 
central voter registration system. Both NVRA and HAVA 
provide challenges for the New York State voter registra-
tion system as they establish legal mandates for services 
the system must provide. Notably, these legal mandates 
cross jurisdictional lines of state and county. 
Six states currently use EDR. Their collective experi-
ence can speak to the advantages of election day regis-
tration and to the challenges and consequences of its 
implementation. When studying the likely impact of 
EDR on California, Alvarez and Ansolabehere looked at 
the results from two metropolitan areas in states using 
EDR - Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota and Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin -  and found:2
• In the long run, states that have adopted EDR show 
an increase in participation rates of 3 to 6 percentage 
points of the voting-age population. In California, such 
an increase would translate into as many as 1.2 million 
new voters. 
• Voting rates of young people and of people who have 
recently moved are especially likely to improve, but the 
partisan composition of the electorate may be little 
changed. 
• Fraud is minimal, in part because of precautions taken 
by the states. 
• Administration is in some ways more complicated but 
in other ways improved. The quality of service at the 
polling place is no worse, and may be better. With EDR 
almost all registrations are done under the auspices 
of the election office and after providing some form 
of identification. Fewer people will register by mail, 
through registration drives, or at other government 
offices. The main difficulty is making sure that new 
voters go to the right polling place. 
 They also identified three keys to proper 
implementation: 
• Requirements for proper identification, including 
driver’s licenses, utility bills, or affidavits signed by 
registered voters. 
• Development and implementation of procedures that 
will get prospective voters to the right polling places. 
• Changes in polling place organization and increased 
polling place staff. 
Based on their earlier analysis, and our further study 
of EDR, we are confident that EDR can be established in 
New York in such a way as to minimize the potential prob-
lems with fraud and election administration. New York 
can join a growing number of states considering the use 
of election day registration to make voting easier for their 
citizens, in particular, Connecticut and Massachusetts.3 In 
A.5762, potential problems are minimized as there is no 
procedural change at the polling place.
1. Introduction
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tate voter registration and are not equipped to answer 
people’s questions.”7 Table 2 shows that the overwhelm-
ing majority of New Yorkers register at the Department of 
Motor Vehicles. With election day registration, one would 
expect that future registrants would elect to be registered 
by election officials on election day. These face-to-face reg-
istrations by trained elections staff are likely to be more 
secure that those accomplished through the mail. 
3. EDR and Turnout
T he primary argument in favor of EDR is that it should increase voter turnout. Figure 1 shows the registration and voter turnout rates in New 
York in presidential elections since 1960. Turnout has 
fallen from 66.5% to 50.4% of the voting age population 
— mirroring national trends. This decline in turnout was 
the primary motivation for passage of the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993. 
Academic studies have repeatedly demonstrated that 
the requirement for voters to register well in advance of 
elections is the largest institutional hurdle to voter par-
ticipation in the United States. And studies of EDR have 
concluded that it has led to a 3 to 6 percent increase in 
turnout in states using it.8
Table 3 (see page 5) compares the registration and 
turnout rates for EDR and non-EDR states in the 2000 
election. In states with election day registration, on aver-
age 88.8% of eligible voters were registered to vote. That 
figure fell to 77.3% in states without election day registra-
tion. Voter turnout was also 15% higher in EDR states.9
Note that in New York, voter turnout was close to that 
generally seen in the non-EDR states, at 50.4% of the vot-
ing age population.
These results are consistent with the academic litera-
ture that demonstrates the powerful relationship between 
barriers to registration and turnout. Allowing voters to 
register on election day at the polling place completely 
eliminates the single largest barrier to voting. However, 
we caution that states currently using EDR allow registra-
tion at the polling place. Thus as written, A.5762, which 
requires registration at a location distinct from the poll-
ing place, is not likely to provide for increases as large as 
those seen in other states with EDR. Even so, EDR is a 
very meaningful reform: it is not merely a bureaucratic 
change with no impact. 
T he current registration system in New York is conceptually straightforward: citizens must register to vote 25 days in advance of the elec-
tion, thus placing themselves on a list of persons eligible 
to vote; on election day lists of eligible (i.e., registered) 
voters are available to the election workers to help insure 
that only eligible voters cast ballots. Registering on elec-
tion day at polling places or election offices would be yet 
another way that citizens could add their names to the 
registration list. 
There are currently six states that have election day 
registration (Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming). One other state (North 
Dakota) simply does not require registration. Idaho, New 
Hampshire, and Wyoming implemented election day regis-
tration following the adoption of NVRA in 1993. In contrast, 
Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have each had election 
day registration for over 25 years, and thus have consider-
able experience using it over many election cycles. While 
details differ across states, all states require some form of 
identification when registering at the polls on election day. 
Idaho requires photo identification and proof of residency; 
Minnesota and Wisconsin allow various combinations of 
identification and proof of residency.4
The states currently using election day registration 
equip each polling place with detailed maps and lists of 
addresses so that any person showing up at the wrong 
polling place can be redirected to the right location. New 
York could do likewise. EDR states also offer provisional 
ballots to individuals who wish to register on election 
day but cannot provide proper identification or seek to 
register at the wrong polling place. These voters fill out a 
separate ballot that is sealed and not counted until their 
eligibility is verified. Like most non-EDR states, New York 
also offers provisional ballots (“affidavit ballots”) in simi-
lar situations.5 In the 2000 presidential election, 221,876 
affidavit ballots were processed statewide; only 127,482 
were eventually credited.6 New York only counts provi-
sional ballots if it can verifiy that the voter had previously 
registered to vote in the election. Under HAVA, all states 
must now offer provisional ballots.
In states such as Minnesota that allow registration at 
the polling place, poll workers are trained on how to reg-
ister people, while new registrants are directed to line up 
in a separate area of the polling place. Similar procedural 
changes will be required in local boards of elections to 
make election day registration work effectively in New 
York. But as proposed by A.5762 overcrowding and long 
lines at the polls would not be a problem as new regis-
trants would be registering at a location different from 
the polling place, and only proceeding to the polling place 
after having registered. 
The names of people who register on election day are 
simply added to the existing registration rolls. Once this 
happens, they continue to be registered and appear on 
the rolls for future elections. On any given election day, 
most voters in EDR states have previously registered. 
Thus for most voters in any given election, election day 
registration would be the exception, not the norm. As it 
is practiced in states that currently use EDR, election day 
registration can be thought of as a combination of two 
reforms: reducing the restriction on how many days in 
advance of an election registration is required, and add-
ing a new registration site - the polling place. As proposed 
by A.5762, election day registration would consist of only 
one of those reforms: changing how far in advance of the 
election voters need to register.
Use of Election Day Registration
Most voters in EDR states choose to register on elec-
tion day. Once convinced that the system really works, 
they opt for one-stop registering and voting at the polling 
place. Table 1 (see p. 4) compares first-time registrants 
in EDR and non-EDR states. In the states with election 
day registration, 55% of first-time registrants simply 
register when they go to the polls on election day. One 
important implication of this is that more voters are reg-
istering at sites under the control of election officials in 
EDR states than in non-EDR states. According to Alvarez 
and Ansolabehere, election officials “said they prefer for 
people to register at the election office. They are frus-
trated that the procedures required by the NVRA have 
put components of voter registration into offices, like 
departments of motor vehicles that do not wish to facili-
2. EDR in New York
States 
without 
EDR
States 
with 
EDR
Election Office 17.7 19.2
Registry of Motor Vehicles 41.5 17.3
WIC Office 1.9 0.6
At Polling Place 0 54.9 
Mail-in Registration 13.0 1.8
Registration Drive 12.5 1.8
School or Hospital 6.7 2.9
Other 6.6 1.7
TABLE 1
How People First Register in States 
without and with EDR
Source: Current Population Survey, US Bureau of the Census, 2000
TABLE 2
Sources of Voter Registration – 2002
Department of Motor Vehicle 371,205 78.5%
By Mail 2,462 0.5%
Public Assistance Agencies 76,130 16.1%
Disability Agencies 11,345 2.4% 
State Designated Agencies
/AF Recruiting 12.5 2.5%
Source: New York State Board of Elections Annual Report, 2002
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5.  Implementation Issues: 
Fraud and Cost
N o doubt, insuring the integrity and security of the electoral process is an essential goal of all those who care about making democracy 
work. No election reform, however trivial, should make 
election fraud easier, because the legitimacy of future 
elections could be at risk. But election reformers should 
focus on the real risks, based on careful consideration of 
how the results of similar election reforms work in other 
places.
Concerns about election day voter registration and the 
potential for fraud revolve around assertions that EDR 
could make it easier for ineligible individuals (for example, 
non-citizens) to cast an irretrievable ballot, or for individu-
als to cast multiple ballots in different locations. 
But in practice it is impossible to find any evidence of 
EDR-related election fraud in the states that currently use 
this process for voter registration. As studied extensively 
in an earlier Demos report on EDR,14 there were some 
allegations of EDR-related election fraud following the 
2000 election in Wisconsin. However, these allegations 
were subsequently proven under investigation by the 
Milwaukee County Attorney General’s Office to (in one 
case) lack merit, and (in the other case) involve problems 
with absentee voting and not problems with voter regis-
tration.
Minnesota has also been closely examined. Again, little 
evidence of election fraud was uncovered. In fact, Joan 
Growe, who became Minnesota’s Secretary of State in the 
same year in which EDR was adopted, has stated that in 
“over 24 years in office, I supervised a registration process 
that consistently gave our state the highest voter turnout 
in the nation, with no increase in election fraud.”15
States with election day registration have managed to 
make the voter registration process easier (and thereby 
allow more people to vote) and to maintain the integrity 
of the electoral process through strict procedural con-
trols. Both Minnesota and Wisconsin have adopted steep 
criminal penalties for fraud. Both states have required 
• A 12.3 percentage point increase in turnout by 18-to-
25-year-olds.
• A 9.8 percentage point increase in turnout by those 
with a grade school education or less.
• An 11 point increase in turnout by Latinos and an 
8.7 percentage point increase in turnout by African 
Americans.
• A 10.1 percentage point increase in turnout by those 
who have lived at their current address for less than six 
months.
• A 12.2 percentage point increase in turnout by natural-
ized citizens.
From these estimates, it is clear that EDR in New York 
would strongly affect groups who are currently consid-
ered to be low-propensity voters.
A separate question is whether the partisan composi-
tion of the voting public would change substantially if 
New York allows registration at the polls. The answer 
appears to be no. Professors Raymond Wolfinger of the 
University of California at Berkeley and Ben Highton of 
the University of California at Davis have studied this 
question extensively. Although nonvoters and voters dif-
fer politically, adoption of election day registration and 
changes in the closing date for pre-registration have pro-
duced only slight changes in the party division of the vote 
in states that have adopted those reforms.13
To some, this prediction is surprising. But it is simply 
a result of the arithmetic of partisanship in the United 
States: both major parties have significant shares of vot-
ers across all income and education groups. As a result, 
we expect little change in the partisan division of the elec-
torate, but we expect that more people will vote in New 
York if the state adopts election day registration.
W e think that the potential effect of EDR on voting may be even greater in New York than in most other states.10 The reason for 
this is related to the demographics of New York and the 
impact of election day registration. In states that have 
adopted EDR, the largest increases in participation rates 
have occurred for two groups: 18-to-25-year-olds and those 
who have moved in the six months before the election.
Among 18-to-25-year-olds, voter turnout is 12 percent-
age points higher in states with EDR than it is in states 
without EDR. Voter turnout is 8 percentage points higher 
among older cohorts in EDR states. Hence, EDR could 
make a significant improvement in the civic participation 
of young people.
The relationship between EDR and mobility shows 
a similar effect. Among those who moved within the 
prior six months, voter turnout was 13 percentage points 
higher in states with EDR than it was in other states. Voter 
turnout was 7 percentage points higher in EDR states 
among those who had been in their current residence at 
least six months.
Adjusting for the effects of age, mobility, and many 
other factors, New York could see its long-run turnout 
rate increase by a much as 8.6 percentage points in presi-
dential elections. This means that turnout in the 2000 
presidential election in New York could have been as high 
as 59 percent had EDR been in place.11
We view this as an upper bound for the potential 
increase in participation, as under the current legisla-
tive proposal, New York might implement election day 
registration differently from in other states. But the impli-
cation of this analysis is significant: based on the experi-
ences of other states with EDR, as many as 1 million more 
New Yorkers might have voted in the 2000 election.
Groups with Low Current Turnout Will See the 
Highest Increase Under EDR
Furthermore, our statistical analysis shows that under 
EDR there could be sizable increases in participation by 
some of the groups that now have low rates of voter turn-
out in New York.12 We find that the implementation of 
EDR in New York would lead to:
4.  New York Might See Bigger Increases 
in Turnout Than Other States
Registration Turnout
EDR States 88.8% 65.6%
Non-EDR States 77.3% 50.5%
New York 81.6% 50.4%
Nationwide 77.7% 51.3%
TABLE 3
Registration and Turnout as Percentages 
in the 2000 General Election
Source: Federal Election Commission
Source: Federal Election Commission
FIGURE 1
Historical Registration and Turnout in New York
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6.  Conclusion: 
Why We Favor EDR for New York
D ecades of research and study after study have found that pre-election voter registration pro-cedures serve as barriers to voter participa-
tion, especially for certain groups of citizens. Election day 
registration is an effective reform that eliminates this par-
ticular barrier to greater voter participation. Accordingly, 
we see EDR as an important election reform that New 
York should adopt.
In our analysis, we found that EDR should increase 
voter registration and turnout in New York. In particu-
lar, we found that after adjusting for the effects of age, 
mobility, and many other factors, New York could see its 
long-run turnout rate increase by a much as 8.6 percent-
age points in presidential elections. Turnout in the 2000 
presidential election in New York could have been as high 
as 59 percent if EDR had been in place. 
However, our estimates of the effect of EDR on turnout 
are based on the experiences of other EDR states, which 
allow same day registration at the polling place. As cur-
rent New York proposals would require voters to register 
on election day at a location other than the polling place, 
the actual impact of this form of EDR on turnout is likely 
to be less than the estimates that we report here. Under 
those scenarios, EDR in New York would entail two steps: 
registration at a local board of elections, and then casting 
a ballot at the appropriate local polling place. Were New 
York to pursue a one-step registration and voting process, 
the effects on voter turnout would likely be in line with 
those we estimate based on the experiences of other 
states now using EDR.
We also documented how EDR may make voting 
easier for citizens who have the most difficulty maintain-
ing an up-to-date voter registration record in New York. 
Our analysis predicts the following possible changes in 
the composition of New York’s electorate, based on the 
experience of states now using EDR:
• A 12.3 percentage point increase in turnout by 18-to-
25-year-olds.
• A 9.8 percentage point increase in turnout by those 
with a grade school education or less.
• An 11 point increase in turnout by Latinos and an 8.7 per-
centage point increase in turnout by African Americans.
• A 10.1 percentage point increase in turnout by those 
who have lived at their current address for less than six 
months.
• A 12.2 percentage point increase in turnout by natural-
ized citizens.
Last, we presented arguments against EDR: its impact 
on election administration, the cost of elections, and the 
potential for voter fraud. We analyzed these arguments 
and, as in previous studies, found that states currently 
using EDR have developed effective laws and procedures 
that serve to minimize or eliminate these concerns. New 
York can effectively address these problems by making 
fraud prevention a top priority, by changing specific poll-
ing place practices, and providing training to election 
officials and polling place workers on how to effectively 
implement EDR in New York.
election day registration, such as by making voter regis-
tration offenses subject to strong criminal penalties, and 
like Minnesota, making sure that all fraud allegations are 
immediately and thoroughly investigated. 
Those who oppose election day registration also argue 
that it can make election administration more compli-
cated. After all, they claim, polling place workers and 
election officials are already overworked and underpaid. 
By requiring them to register new voters, EDR would only 
increase their burden. They frequently assert that EDR 
will lead to longer lines in polling places, and produce 
backlogs. 
But the evidence from current EDR states suggests oth-
erwise. Existing data indicates that states with EDR have 
worked to resolve these problems effectively. Whereas 2.8 
percent of non-voters in states that do not allow election 
day registration cited problems at polling places (includ-
ing long lines, inconvenient hours or polling place loca-
tions) as the reason why they did not cast a ballot in the 
2000 presidential election, only 1.8 percent of residents in 
EDR states cited that same reason.18
Again, the unique implementation of EDR proposed 
by A.5762 in New York would entirely pre-empt such 
problems, as voter registration itself would take place at a 
local board of elections. 
To smoothly implement EDR in New York polling 
places, a number of other procedures from states now 
using EDR can be adopted: 
1. Provide comprehensive training to polling place or 
election board workers about the procedures for elec-
tion day registration. 
2. Have additional workers on hand on election day to 
help register voters.
3. Give newly registered voters clear information about 
where they need to go to vote, perhaps including 
actual directions and maps to the right polling place, 
should registrations occur at the offices of county 
boards of elections, as proposed in A.5762.
4. Provide detailed information at each polling place 
about where people in the jurisdiction should vote, 
and direct voters to the correct polling place if they 
come to the wrong location.
5. Post in each polling place a visible and clear statement 
of the penalties for voting illegally. 
6. Require the post-election investigation of all allega-
tions of fraud.
With appropriate procedures in place, New York can 
welcome more citizens to the polling place on election 
day, and ensure that their voting experience is simple, 
effective, and positive.
It is true that these procedural changes --- and others 
that might be required if EDR is implemented in New 
York --- might call for additional resources for training 
polling place or election board workers. It is also possible 
that additional staff may be needed at polling places 
or elections offices under EDR. Will this substantially 
increase the costs of elections in New York?
We do not believe that EDR will substantially raise the 
costs of elections in New York, and HAVA funds could be 
used to help pay for EDR if it were instituted now. It is 
instead more likely to require a reallocation of resources. 
Under EDR, we expect that counties will shift part of their 
voter registration operations from the hectic days before 
the election to election day itself. Fewer resources will be 
devoted to voter registration before the election, result-
ing in less mail to process, fewer registration requests to 
authenticate and enter into voter registration databases, 
and fewer staff deployed to register voters prior to the 
election. Thus, while EDR may increase costs in the short-
term, it is unlikely that it will impose excessive and recur-
ring demands on New York’s perennially tight election 
administration budgets.
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native born, and the length of time the respondent has lived 
at his or her current address. We do not include interactions 
of EDR with every individual-level variable included in the 
analysis, because many are statistically insignificantly related 
to registration and turnout and when included demand such 
a multitude of coefficients that estimation is difficult.
Our purpose with this analysis is to explain two things: 
voter registration and voter turnout. As dependent variables, 
each of these is binary. A registration value of 1 indicates 
being registered to vote and a turnout value of 1 indicates 
having turned out to vote, whereas zeros for each variable 
indicate the opposite. Traditionally, a simple binary logit 
model is appropriate for this type of analysis. However, 
because we are especially interested in the differing effects 
of state institutions on turnout and registration, we wish to 
control for the random disturbances that may be unique to 
each of the 50 US states. We do this with a random-effects 
logit model. We estimate four such random-effects logit mod-
els: one predicting voter registration and another predicting 
turnout for each of the general elections in 1998 and 2000.
All of the variables — with the exception only of some 
of the interaction specifications — are significantly related 
to turnout. The influence of these factors substantiates our 
hypothesis of their role in determining the individual’s cost 
of voting and supports similar descriptions by past studies of 
voting in the political science literature.
It is important to recognize the implications of the non-
linear relationship between the individual’s estimated util-
ity for the dependent variable action (registering or voting) 
and the probability that he or she will take that action. This 
nonlinearity means that the magnitude of the impact of an 
independent variable on the likelihood that an individual 
registers or votes can be better understood by calculating 
the change in the predicted probabilities due to shifts in 
the independent variable rather than by simply looking at 
tables of estimated coefficients. This is especially true for 
understanding the effects of interactions like those between 
EDR and the cost variables. The nonlinearities of probit and 
logit models essentially formulate an unmeasured interac-
tive specification among the predictive variables.25 For this 
reason, the predicted coefficients for the variables tell us little 
about their true impact on the individual’s likely action. It is 
only by calculating the change in the probabilities of an indi-
vidual voting or registering under counterfactual scenarios 
that we may understand the impact of a variable on the 
individual’s behavior.
Given this, we evaluate the effect of EDR on registration 
and voting by simulating the change it would bring about 
in the individual’s predicted probabilities of taking either 
action. As this study is concerned primarily with the effect 
of this change in the state of New York, we do this exercise 
only for CPS respondents living in New York at the time they 
were surveyed. We first calculate the predicted probabilities 
that each New Yorker registered and voted. We then set the 
values of the EDR variables to what they would be if New 
York implemented EDR and adjust the EDR interactions 
accordingly, and then recalculate the predicted probabilities 
that each New Yorker registered and voted. Averaging across 
New York respondents for each of these two sets of predicted 
probabilities and taking the difference between them gives 
us an estimate of the increase in the aggregate rates of regis-
tration and turnout in New York under EDR.
Voter registration and voter turnout in New York are 
expected to increase dramatically under EDR. In 1998, voter reg-
istration would have increased by an estimated 6.3 percentage 
points (meaning 724,050 new registered voters) and voter turn-
out would have increased by an estimated 5.2 percentage points 
(meaning 595,375 additional voters) among the eligible voting 
age population. In 2000, voter registration would have increased 
by an estimated 2.6 percentage points (meaning 306,124 new 
registered voters) and voter turnout would have increased by an 
estimated 8.6 percentage points (meaning 1,019,767 additional 
voters), again among the eligible voting-age population.
Perhaps more important than these overall increases in 
registration and turnout are the expected relative increases 
among those who are traditionally least likely to vote. 
Turnout among those who are younger, less educated, less 
wealthy, and part of a minority group is likely to increase by 
more than turnout among other groups of eligible voters. 
This would serve to make the voting population much more 
representative of the general population. Thus, under EDR 
the between voters and nonvoters would greatly diminish, 
helping to ensure adequate representation of all constituents’ 
political interests.
Technical Appendix
T o estimate the impact of EDR in New York, we perform statistical analyses on the reported voting behavior of people who responded to surveys con-
ducted by the US Census Bureau in 1998 and 2000. In doing 
so, we examine registration and turnout among eligible voters 
across the United States, controlling for individual character-
istics as well as for state characteristics — most importantly, 
the implementation of EDR in the six states listed above. 
We do this with the Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter 
Supplement data collected by the Bureau of the Census at 
the time of the general election in 1998 and 2000. While we 
conducted our analysis of both the 1998 and 2000 elections, 
we utilize only the 2000 data in the body of this report.19 The 
1998 analysis confirms the conclusions reported in the text for 
the 2000 election.
The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households 
conducted for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has 
been conducted for more than 50 years. In each even-num-
bered year since 1964, the November Current Population 
Survey has included questions about registration and turn-
out. The sheer size of this data collection makes it particu-
larly well suited for our analysis. Unlike the NES and the GSS 
collections, the CPS survey is administered to a large sample 
of citizens in each of the 50 US states. This enables it to yield 
very accurate estimates of the influence of both individual 
and state institutional factors on voting behavior.
A long literature in political science on voting and turn-
out, extending back to the 1940’s, demonstrates that voting 
and turnout are strongly correlated with demographic vari-
ables — particularly age, education, and income.20 Common 
theories of voting behavior suggest that these variables 
affect the costs an individual incurs in finding out about 
political issues and the candidates running for office, as well 
as the mechanical hurdles associated with voting, such as 
the registration deadline and the location of polling places. 
For this reason, we include the following individual-specific 
variables in our analysis: age, education, race gender, marital 
status, family income, home ownership,21 whether or not one 
is a native-born US citizen,22 and length of time at current 
address.
Four factors — the person’s age, education, race, and 
income — are coded categorically. The respondent’s age is 
measured using five dummy variables denoting an age of 
18 to 25 years, 26 to 35 years, 36 to 45 years, 46 to 60 years, 
or 61 to 75 years. The respondent’s education is measured 
with three variables indicating that he or she has some 
grade school or high school education, a high school degree, 
or some college education (a BA degree is the omitted cat-
egory). The race of the respondent is measured by three 
dummy variables denoting whether or not he or she self-
identifies as white, black, or Hispanic. Lastly, the respondent’s 
family income is categorized by three variables demarcating 
an income of $0-20,000 per year, $20,000-40,000 per year, or 
$40,000-60,000 per year ($60,000 and up is the omitted cat-
egory). Gender, marital status, home ownership, whether or 
not one is a native-born citizen, and length of time at current 
address are each measured by simple dummy variables. If 
each of these variables takes on a value of 1, the respondent 
is male, married, a native-born US citizen, and a homeowner 
with less than six months at his or her current address. A 
value of zero for any of these variables denotes otherwise for 
the feature to which the variable pertains.
With this data of individual-specific characteristics we 
merge relevant contextual information from the Council of 
State Governments (1998-99, 2000-01)23 using state codes 
included by the CPS. Three of these variables are determined 
by state electoral practices: whether or not the state has a 
voter registration system24; the number of days the registra-
tion deadline occurs before the election; and whether or not 
the state has election day registration. Three other variables 
are determined by the competitiveness in the relevant state 
of the year’s gubernatorial and senate races, as well as the 
competitiveness of the presidential race in the state in 2000. 
For each of these races we produce a dummy variable that is 
coded a 1 when the result of the designated race was deter-
mined by a margin of 5 percent or less of the total number 
of votes.
An important feature of EDR is its potential to increase 
turnout and registration more strongly among those who face 
high costs of voting and are therefore traditionally less likely 
to turn out to vote. To test for such effects, we include in our 
analysis interactions between the dummy variable indicat-
ing EDR and the variables measuring the respondent’s age, 
education, family income, whether or not the respondent is 
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